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Abstract
In this paper we explore the information content of a large set of ﬁscal indicators
for US real output growth and inﬂation. We provide evidence that ﬂuctuations in
certain ﬁscal variables contain valuable information to predict ﬂuctuations in output
and prices. The distinction between federal and state-local ﬁscal indicators yields
useful insights and helps deﬁne a new set of stylized facts for US macroeconomic
conditions. First, we ﬁnd that variations in state-local indirect taxes as well as
state government surplus or deﬁcit help predict output growth. Next, the federal
counterparts of these indicators contain valuable information for inﬂation. Finally,
state-local expenditures help predict US inﬂation. A set of formal and informal
stability tests conﬁrm that these relationships are stable. The ﬁscal indicators in
questions are also among the ones that yield the best in-sample and out-of-sample
performances.
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1 Introduction
Economists often rely on non-structural autoregressive econometric models such as unre-
stricted VARs, to explain or to forecast in a parsimonious way variations in key macroe-
conomic variables such as inﬂation and output. While US output variations can be
explained somewhat reliably with the use of a set of relevant variables such as Federal
Funds rate and certain monetary aggregates next to past variations in real output itself,
empirical work confronts signiﬁcant diﬃculties in assigning informative variables to ex-
plain US inﬂation movements. Even the Federal Funds rate fails to provide statistically
signiﬁcant information content to explain inﬂation variations in a stable way (see for
example Friedman and Kuttner (1992); Stock and Watson (2003)).
Macroeconomic theory is paying increasing attention to the interaction between ﬁs-
cal and monetary policymaking in stabilizing inﬂation, employment and real output.
Such an interaction and its consequences for macro-fundamentals are usually studied
within theoretical general equilibrium modelling. However current theoretical models
typically focus on aggregate spending and taxes. We believe that some government ex-
penditure/revenues subcomponents may be better related with macroeconomic variables
due to certain institutional features or preferences of policymakers. In the literature,
there is already evidence that diﬀerent institutional arrangements across US states yield
diﬀerent macroeconomic outcomes at least as far as business cycle ﬂuctuations are con-
cerned. For instance, Fatás and Mihov (2006) provide a thorough empirical analysis of
the macroeconomic eﬀects of the constraints on ﬁscal policy and ﬁnd that states that face
tighter restrictions show less volatile business cycles.
In this paper, we provide new stylized facts for the US economy that may motivate
economic theory to explore new transmission channels of ﬁscal policymaking on macroe-
conomic outcomes. We take a non-structural, direct, statistical approach as suggested by
Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Sims (1972, 1980) and perform a systematic analysis on
the informational role of a wide range of ﬁscal policy indicators to explain US inﬂation
and real output movements. Reduced form/information value approach, as a prelimi-
nary test of statistical connection between certain variables, is immune to questions of
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causality, exogeneity or controllability of potential instruments.
The discretionary motive or the automatic stabilizers' role in ﬁscal policymaking is
an important and complex topic, but is not the subject matter of this paper. For a
recent survey of the macroeconometric literature on the identiﬁcation of discretionary
ﬁscal policy see for istance Caldara and Kamps (2008).
By relying on straightforward statistical tests, we ﬁnd that certain ﬁscal indicators,
contain additional statistically signiﬁcant information to explain US inﬂation and output
growth next to the information contained in the Federal Funds rate and autoregressive
components of inﬂation and real output. In particular, we ﬁnd that changes in the
federal budget, federal indirect taxes, as well as state-local expenditures contain valuable
lead information for US inﬂation. Moreover, state-local budget and state-local indirect
taxes are helpful in predicting US real output growth. Furthermore, informal and formal
statistical tests suggest that the information content present in these variables is stable
over time.
To the best of our knowledge, there is neither a theoretical explanation nor other
empirical contribution highlighting the diﬀerent information content of state-local ﬁscal
variables as opposed to the federal counterparts. We suppose that one possible determi-
nant has to do with the diﬀerent institutional frameworks of the federal and state-local
budgets, which we also document.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the conduct
of US ﬁscal policy in postwar years and reviews some existing literature on state-local
ﬁnances. Section 3 presents the dataset used in the paper. Section 4 reports Granger-style
regressions based on inﬂation and real output equations that include a set of alternative
ﬁscal indicators together with the Federal Funds rate. Section 5 conducts stability tests.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Fiscal evolution in the US
Since the 1930s the presence of government in the US economy has steadily increased.
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<Insert Figure 1 here>
Figure 1-(a) shows that in postwar times government expenditures have increased from
15 percent of GDP to reach almost 25 percent in the late 1950s and be around 20 percent
in more recent times. If we add also transfers - which do not enter the deﬁnition of GDP
- and consider total government expenditures, which we plot in Figure 2-(b), the share is
even higher. In 2008 total expenditures have exceeded 35 percent of GDP.
The increase in government expenditures has been recorded both at the federal and
at the state-local level. Nevertheless, while state-local receipts have always accompanied
the pattern of expenditures, at the federal level expenditures have been higher than
revenues for long periods of time. As Figure 1-(c) shows, in the ﬁrst part of the post-war
period, the federal budget followed a pattern of deﬁcits during wartime and economic
crises and surpluses during peacetime and economic expansion. From 1970 to 1997, the
federal deﬁcit was sustained and the budget never balanced. Only in 1998 the federal
budget reported its ﬁrst surplus since 1969. The budget was again in deﬁcit in 2004. In
2005, it began to shrink as a consequence of an increase in tax revenues. Afterwards, a
pronounced increase in the federal deﬁcit was recorded.
As Figure 1-(c) shows, the sum of state-local budgets behaved in a diﬀerent way. In
aggregate terms, state-local ﬁnances have been close to balanced budget. Indeed, when
it comes to US state budgets, the leitmotif is balanced budget rules. Although across the
US there are disparities in the set of ﬁscal rules that governs a state's ability to raise and
spend revenue, all states but Vermont have a more or less stringent ﬁscal discipline that
foresees balanced budgets. The requirements of the other 49 states can be divided into
four groups (Poterba, 1996):
1. In 44 states, the governor must submit a balanced budget, but the state does not
have to enact a budget that matches expenditures and revenues.
2. In 37 states, the legislature must enact a balanced budget, yet actual revenues and
expenditures may diverge if there are unexpected ﬁscal shocks after the budget is
adopted.
4
3. In 6 states, when an unexpected deﬁcit develops during the ﬁscal year, the governor
has to correct the deﬁcit in the next budget cycle. Because budget cycles in some
states are biennial, this requirement permits substantial periods of budget deﬁcits.
4. In 24 out of the 37 states with balanced budget requirements, the constitution
prohibits the government from carrying deﬁcits into the next budget cycle. This
provision represents the strictest anti-deﬁcit rule, as it requires the legislature either:
i. to cut spending; or
ii. to raise taxes in the ﬁscal year when the deﬁcit emerges; or
iii. to ﬂoat short-term debt to be retired in the next ﬁscal year.
In 1987, the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) constructed
an index that characterizes ﬁscal discipline among state governments and ranges from 0
(lax) to 10 (stringent). Only eight states received ACIR scores of 5 or below, whereas 26
received a score of 10 (see Figure 2).
<Insert Figure 2 here>
Some researchers investigated implications of these institutional arrangements, for
key macroeconomic variables, particularly for real output, and for macroeconomic policy.
Sørensen and Yosha (2001), for instance, use panel estimation to show that state ﬁscal
policy has a stabilizing inﬂuence on output, but this inﬂuence diﬀer across business
cycles expansions and downturns. When state income rises, government revenue initially
increases and then reverts to its initial level, while expenditure remains roughly constant.
However, when state income falls, both revenue and expenditure decline with revenue
remaining low for a sustained period. Such asymmetries appear to be associated with
balanced budget rules or political conservatism (that may in turn lead to constitutional
balanced budget rules). More precisely, the tighter the budget rules, the less eﬀective
is ﬁscal policy at stimulating the economy than it is at slowing it. On the contrary, in
states with relatively less strict budget rules, such as Massachusetts and New York, ﬁscal
policy appears to mitigate economic slowdowns more than it mutes booms.
5
Traditionally ﬁscal policy has received less attention than monetary policy in the
macroeconomic literature and, with few exceptions, state ﬁscal policy has almost been
neglected. Among others, Poterba and Rueben (1999) evaluate the eﬀects of state-level
revenue and expenditure limits on borrowing costs; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (1990)
estimate the impact of inﬂation on the real expenditures of US state-local government;
and Sørensen et al. (2001) investigate the cyclical properties of US state-local government
ﬁnances.
State-local expenditures currently account for 15 percent of US GDP, while federal
expenditures have reached more than 20 percent of GDP. Hence both federal and state
budgets represent large shares of the US economy. Moreover, federal and state ﬁscal
policy are intrinsically diﬀerent because institutional and constitutional arrangements
foresee a diﬀerent discipline for their conduct.
In the remainder of this paper we distinguish among a large set of aggregate, federal
and state-local ﬁscal indicators and perform a systematic evaluation of their information-
content role on US output growth and inﬂation.
3 The data
In the following empirical analysis we use quarterly seasonally-adjusted data covering
the period 1955:1-2007:4. We consider US macroeconomic variables, including (i) the
real output, represented by GDP expressed in chained 2000 US dollars; (ii) the price
level, represented by the GDP deﬂator; (iii) the interest rate, represented by the three-
month federal funds rate (middle rate for each quarter); (iv) thirty-one ﬁscal indicators
belonging to government current receipts and expenditures at the national, federal and
state-local levels; (v) a set of price indices for government consumption expenditures
and gross investment. Most series are extracted from the database of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). Federal funds rates are extracted from the database of the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Table 1 reports full descriptions and sources of all
the series.
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<Insert Table 1 here>
As the detailed ﬁscal variables under investigation are provided in nominal terms,
we deﬂate them using appropriate price indices. Then, we compute percentage changes
in the form of annualized log-diﬀerences.1 Only in the cases of government deﬁcits or
surpluses we use proper percentage changes, as they may be negative numbers. We also
express the real output growth and the rate of inﬂation as annualized log-diﬀerences. For
the sake of comparability, we also annualize the interest rate. We report details of all
data transformations in Table 2.
<Insert Table 2 here>
In Table 3, we report the results of unit root tests performed on all the series con-
structed as explained above. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP)
tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for real output growth and the growth rates
of all the ﬁscal variables. The level of the interest rate satisﬁes stationarity properties
according to the PP test at a 5 percent signiﬁcant level and also according to the ADF
test at a 10 percent signiﬁcance level. The rate of inﬂation is stationary only according
to the PP test. In the remainder of the paper we rely on the stationarity of all the
aforementioned series.
<Insert Table 3 here>
4 Granger non-causality tests
In this section, we investigate the information content of ﬂuctuations of ﬁscal indicators
for output growth and inﬂation by means of Granger non-causality tests. By deﬁnition
of Granger causality itself (Granger, 1969; Sims, 1972), we are not looking for a proper
causality relationship. Instead, we aim at detecting whether, in the ﬂuctuations of some
ﬁscal indicators, there is exploitable information that helps predict ﬂuctuations in output
1Given a quarterly variable Xt, ∆xt = 400× (lnXt − lnXt−1).
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and prices, beyond those already predictable on the basis of ﬂuctuations in output and
prices themselves and other promptly observable variables, such as the interest rate.
Our speciﬁcations for real output changes and inﬂation follow closely Friedman and
Kuttner (1992). However, while they try a number of alternative ﬁnancial variables
and monetary aggregates as a proxy of the monetary policy instrument, we simply use
the short-term interest rate. This choice depends on the fact that we are interested in
the information content of ﬁscal indicators and not in the comparative performance of
alternative ﬁnancial variables.
The speciﬁcation for real output changes ∆yt is given by the following equation:












γj∆gt−j + νt (1)
The terms ∆yt, ∆pt, it, ∆gt, νt represent output growth, inﬂation, the short term interest
rate, the change in an alternative ﬁscal indicator and an error term respectively.
The inﬂation equation takes the following speciﬁcation:












γj∆gt−j + νt (2)
where all variables are deﬁned as in equation (1).2
<Insert Table 4 here>
In table 4, we report a set of speciﬁcation tests. With the exception of two cases,
the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test and the White test always reject the null hypothesis of
homoskedastic errors. The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange-multiplier test fails to reject the
null of uncorrelated errors. Therefore, throughout the paper we choose to run all tests
based on Wald-type χ-square statistics computed by taking White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Finally, the Ramsey RESET test does not unveil further
mispeciﬁcation issues.
<Insert Table 5 here>
2We also run the tests described below using ﬁrst diﬀerences of the Federal funds rate but diﬀerences
in the results are negligible.
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We test for Granger non-causality of the ﬁscal indicators by imposing the null hy-
pothesis that all the lags of each alternative indicator are jointly insigniﬁcant, i.e. HO :
γi = 0,∀i = 1, ..., 4. In Table 5, we show that ﬂuctuations in government indirect taxes
(taxes on production and import) and in the government surplus/deﬁcit have information
content on both output growth and inﬂation. At a more disaggregated level, ﬂuctuations
in state-local indirect taxes and deﬁcit contain useful information for output growth (at
a 1 percent signiﬁcance level); for inﬂation it is the federal analogues to be informative
(at 1 percent and 5 percent signiﬁcance levels, respectively). Moreover, contributions
for government social insurance at the national and federal level and the non-defense
component of federal expenditures help predict output growth. Finally, state-local to-
tal expenditures, and gross investment help predict inﬂation at a 10 percent signiﬁcance
level.
Some previous studies have explored state-local ﬁnances and we surveyed them in
section 2. However, to our knowledge, there are no other contributions that ﬁnd an
information-content role for state-local expenditures on US inﬂation and state-local rev-
enues or deﬁcits on output growth.
We also report Granger causality tests run on the Federal funds rate. In all speciﬁca-
tions, this is signiﬁcant at a 1 percent level in the output growth equation and insigniﬁcant
in the inﬂation equation.3 However, adding more lags of the interest rate (results not
reported) helps retrieve signiﬁcance also in the inﬂation equation. Thus, in the cases
in which we ﬁnd an information-content role for the ﬁscal variable, the latter does not
substitute but adds further information to that already contained in past values of the
interest rate.
<Insert Table 6 here>
In Table 6, as a measure of comparative goodness of ﬁt, we report the Akaike in-
formation criteria (AIC) of all the estimated speciﬁcations of equations (1) and (2) in
ascending order. All the speciﬁcations in which we ﬁnd information content in the ﬁscal
3In the inﬂation equation, using four lags, the Federal funds rate is insigniﬁcant also in the absence
of any ﬁscal variables.
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variable are among the ones with the lowest AIC (top ten items in Table 5). According
to AIC, the speciﬁcations including indirect taxes are the ones with the best ﬁt.
5 Stability tests
5.1 Stability of recursive p-values
To gain initial guidance about the stability of the Granger-causality relationships above,
we plot the recursive p-values of the Wald tests on the joint insigniﬁcance of the lags of
each alternative ﬁscal indicator.
The methodology consists in computing the p-values of the Wald tests above by recur-
sively changing the sample in the estimation. The resulting plots, using the alternative
ﬁscal indicators, are depicted in ﬁgures 3 and 4. From top to bottom we report stability
of p-values at: (a) the national government level; (b) the federal government level; and
(c) the state-local government level.
We obtain recursive p-values in three diﬀerent ways:
1. by ﬁxing the endpoint (end) of the sample and making the starting point shift
quarter by quarter from an intermediate point in the sample up to the initial ob-
servation. The ﬁrst p-value reported refers to the sample 1980:3-2007:4; the second
p-value refers to the sample 1980:2-2007:4 and so on. The last considered sample
is the full sample 1955:1-2007:4.
2. by ﬁxing the starting point (str) of the sample and making the end point shift
quarter by quarter from an intermediate point of the sample up to the last available
observation. The ﬁrst considered sample is 1955:1-1979:4. The second sample we
consider is 1955:1-1980:1 and so on up to 1955:1-2007:4.
3. by rolling the sample (rol), i.e. by shifting the starting point and the endpoint
of the sample quarter by quarter. Hence the initial sample is 1955:1-1979:4, the
second sample is 1955:2-1980:1 and so on up to 1980:3-2007:4.
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The straight horizontal line in each quadrant of ﬁgures 3 and 4 represents the 10 per-
cent signiﬁcance level. Thus, anything below the line represents rejection of the Granger
non-causality null hypothesis.
<Insert Figure 3 here>
Figure 3 shows that, in the output growth equation, recursive p-values of indirect taxes
are stable at the national level and less stable at the state-local level. For government
surplus/deﬁcit, we ﬁnd that both at the national and the state-local level, they are
statistically signiﬁcant in most subsample though not in all of them. The p-values of
the non-defense part of federal expenditures and contributions for government social
insurance are not stable.
<Insert Figure 4 here>
Figure 4 shows that, apart from some subsamples for government deﬁcit and state-
local investment expenditures, the remaining recursive p-values of the ﬁscal components
for which we ﬁnd an information-content role for inﬂation are stable.
5.2 Formal stability tests
To formally evaluate the stability of coeﬃcients in the Granger-style speciﬁcations, we
run stability tests for one or more unknown structural breakpoints in the autoregressive
coeﬃcients of the ﬁscal variables.
We compute three diﬀerent statistics: the Quandt likelihood ratio statistic in Wald
form (sup-Wald) as in Andrews (1993); the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) exponential
average Wald statistic (exp-Wald); and the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) average Wald
statistic (mean-Wald). We apply a 15 percent symmetric sample trimming, which allows
us to check whether a breakpoint has occurred in the interval 1963:1-1998:4.
<Insert Table 7 here>
Table 7 displays the results of the tests. They fail to reject the null hypothesis of
parameter constancy in all cases.4
4The approximate asymptotic p-values are provided by Hansen (1997).
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5.3 Out-of-sample properties
To evaluate the out-of-sample performances of the estimated equations, we use recursive
least squares. For each equation speciﬁcation, we compute all feasible cases, starting from
the smallest possible sample size and adding one observation at a time. At each step, we
save the one-step ahead forecast error to obtain a series of recursive residuals.5
<Insert Table 8 here>
We use each series of recursive residuals to compute the correspondent root mean
squared errors (RMSE), which we report in Table 8 in ascending order. A relatively
low RMSE can be interpreted as a further indicator of stability of the speciﬁcation in
question in comparative terms. The ordering obtained in Table 8 is virtually coincident
to the ordering implied by AIC in Table 6. The speciﬁcations where ﬁscal variables have
stable information content for output growth or inﬂation are also the ones with the best
out-of-sample performances. Indirect taxes yield the lowest RMSE both in the output
growth and in the inﬂation equation.
6 Concluding remarks
By running a number of straightforward statistical tests, we provide evidence that ﬂuc-
tuations in certain ﬁscal variables contain valuable information to predict ﬂuctuations
in output and prices. Our analysis also shows that the distinction between federal and
state-local ﬁscal indicators provides useful insights.
First, we ﬁnd that variations in state-local indirect taxes as well as state government
surplus or deﬁcit help predict output growth. Next, the federal counterparts of these
indicators contain valuable information for inﬂation. Finally, state-local expenditures
help predict US inﬂation.
5To obtain the recursive residuals we scale each one-step ahead forecast error by a term proportional
to the forecast variance. Namely, let x′tbt−1 be the forecast, where x
′
t is the row vector of observations
on the regressors in period t and bt−1 is the estimated vector of coeﬃcients obtained by using data up
to period t − 1. The forecast error is yt − x′tbt−1, where yt is the actual observation of the dependent
variable, while the forecast variance is σ2
(














A set of formal and informal stability tests conﬁrm that these relationships are stable.
The ﬁscal indicators in questions are also among the ones that yield the best in-sample
and out-of-sample performances.
In sum, we provide new stylized facts for US macroeconomic conditions related to
ﬁscal indicators. We believe that these new stylized facts can help identify possible ﬁscal
and monetary policy transmission channels that can be explored in future empirical and
theoretical research.
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Variables Measurement unit Type Freq. Sample
Gross domestic product Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5
Real Gross Domestic Product Billions of 2000 dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.6
Implicit GDP deflator Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.9
Three-month federal funds rate Percentage MR Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 Federal Reserve Board
Government Current Receipts and Expenditures:
Current tax receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Personal current taxes Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Taxes on production and imports Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Taxes on corporate income Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Contributions for government social insurance Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Total expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Current expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Gross government investment Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Net lending or net borrowing (-) Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1
Federal Government Current Receipts and Expenditures:
Total receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Current tax receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Personal current taxes Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Taxes on production and imports Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Taxes on corporate income Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Contributions for government social insurance Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Total expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Current expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Gross government investment Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
Federal defense expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5
Federal nondefense expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5
Net lending or net borrowing (-) Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2
State and Local Government Current Receipts and Expenditures: 
Total receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Current tax receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Personal current taxes Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Taxes on production and imports Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Taxes on corporate income Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Current transfer receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Total expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Current expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Gross government investment Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Net lending or net borrowing (-) Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3
Price Indices for Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment:
Government expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Government consumption expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Government gross investment Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Federal expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Federal consumption expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Federal gross investment Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
National defense Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
Federal nondefense expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
State and local expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
State and local consumption expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
State and local gross investment Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4
SA = seasonally adjusted; MR = middle rate; Q.ly = quarterly; BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis; NIPA = National Income and Product Accounts
Source













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Government expenditures less transfers/GDP Federal expenditures less transfers/GDP
State and local expenditures less transfers/GDP








































































Government total expenditures/GDP Government total receipts/GDP
Federal total expenditures/GDP Federal total receipts/GDP
State and local total expenditures/GDP State and local total receipts/GDP









































































Government surplus/GDP Federal surplus/GDP State and local surplus/GDP
(c) Government surpluses or deﬁcits.
Figure 1: US government expenditures and receipts as fractions of GDP (Source: our
computations using BEA data).
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(c) state-local government current receipts and expenditures.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(c) state-local government current receipts and expenditures.
Figure 4: Recursive p-values of Granger non-causality tests on ﬁscal indicators in the
inﬂation equation.
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